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EXTENDING THE CRITICAL REREADING PROJECT 
Gabrielle Appleby & Rosalind Dixon* 
We want to start by congratulating Kathryn Stanchi, Linda Berger, and Bridget 
Crawford for a wonderful collection of feminist judgments that provide a rich and 
provocative rereading of U.S. Supreme Court gender-justice cases.1  It is an 
extremely important contribution to the growing international feminist judgments 
project—in which leading feminist academics, lawyers, and activists imagine 
alternative feminist judgments to existing legal cases—which commenced with the 
seminal UK Feminist Judgments Project.2  The original 2010 UK Project was based 
on the initially online Canadian community known as the Canadian Women’s 
Court.3 
These works bring feminist critiques of legal doctrine from an external, 
commentary-based perspective to a position where such critiques might breathe 
reality into the possibility of feminist judgment writing.  A feminist rewriting can 
change the way the story is told, the voices that are heard in the story, and the context 
in which it unfolds.  Today, the feminist judgments project, having expanded across 
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 1 FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: REWRITTEN OPINIONS OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 
(Kathryn M. Stanchi, Linda L. Berger & Bridget J. Crawford eds., 2016) [hereinafter FEMINIST 
JUDGMENTS]. 
 2 FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE (Rosemary Hunter et al., eds., 2010); 
see also AUSTRALIAN FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: RIGHTING AND REWRITING LAW (Heather Douglas 
et al., eds., 2014); FEMINIST JUDGMENTS OF AOTEAROA NEW ZEALAND: TE RINO: A TWO-
STRANDED ROPE (Elisabeth McDonald et al., eds., 2017); NORTHERN/IRISH FEMINIST 
JUDGMENTS: JUDGES’ TROUBLES AND THE GENDERED POLITICS OF IDENTITY (Máiréad Enright et 
al., eds., 2017).  There is also an international feminist judgments project to be published soon by 
Hart.  See Loveday Hodson & Troy Lavers, Feminist Judgments in International Law, 
VÖLKERRECHTSBLOG (Apr. 24, 2017), https://voelkerrechtsblog.org/feminist-judgments-in-
international-law/. 
 3 A number of the Canadian Women’s Court judgments were published in special editions 
of the Canadian Journal of Women and Law.  See, e.g., Melina Buckley, Symes v. Canada, 18 
CAN. J. WOMEN & L. 27 (SPECIAL ISSUE) (2006); Mary Eberts et al., , Native Women’s Association 
of Canada v. Canada, 18 CAN. J. WOMEN & L. 67 (SPECIAL ISSUE) (2006); Dianne Pothier, Eaton 
v. Brant County Board of Education, 18 CAN. J. WOMEN & L. 121 (SPECIAL ISSUE) (2006).  
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the world, is now being joined by other critical rereading projects, such as the Wild 
Law Judgment Project and the Children’s Rights Judgments Project.4 
In this reflection, we want to explain a project in Australia that extends the 
feminist judgments project and adapts it specifically for the purpose of teaching 
critical theory, critical legal thinking, and the assumptions inherent in the legal 
method. 
This is not to say, as Stanchi, Berger, and Crawford acknowledge in their 
introduction to the U.S. collection, that the feminist judgments project does not also 
have an educative objective.  But its core objectives are elsewhere.  As Stanchi, 
Berger, and Crawford explain, the feminist judgments project’s goals are: 
 
(a) To unmask the claims of neutrality and objectivity that continue and protect 
traditional power hierarchies; 
(b) By unmasking these claims, exposing the possibility that the perspectives 
of decisionmakers may be broadened and result in change; and 
(c) To provide an exploratory account of what feminist judicial 
decisionmaking might look like, how it might have practical application in 
judging and decisionmaking, and how that might change substantive 
outcomes, reasoning, and style.5 
 
The editors of the U.S. Project also acknowledge this rereading project will 
have an important “educational function,” for students to learn about the law and 
feminism, for the legal community and the wider public to “learn about the way law 
works, what cases mean, and how the identity and philosophy of judges matter,” and 
to contemplate the arc of justice and the role of judges in achieving justice.6 
Certainly, the feminist judgments project collections are helpful vehicles for 
teaching critical legal thinking to students and, since the publication of the first UK 
feminist judgments collection, have been employed as such across a number of 
courses and institutions.7 
In our own project, The Critical Judgments Project: Re-reading Monis v The 
Queen,8 we recognize the feminist judgments project as seminal, but we also 
recognize that feminist perspectives represent only a limited critical viewpoint from 
 
 4 See generally LAW AS IF EARTH REALLY MATTERED: THE WILD LAW JUDGMENT 
PROJECT (Nicole Rogers & Michelle Maloney eds., 2017); REWRITING CHILDREN’S RIGHTS 
JUDGMENTS: FROM ACADEMIC VISION TO NEW PRACTICE (Helen Stalford et al., eds., 2017). 
 5 See FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra note 1, at 4−6. 
 6 Id. at 22.  
 7 See, e.g., supra note 4 and accompanying text; see also Rosemary Auchmuty, Using 
Feminist Judgments in the Property Law Classroom, 46 LAW TCHR. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 227 (2012); 
Jennifer Koshan et al., Rewriting Equality: The Pedagogical Use of Women’s Court of Canada 
Judgments, 4 CANADIAN LEGAL EDUC. ANN. REV. 121 (2010); Tamara Tulich, Using Feminist 
Legal Judgments in Public Law Teaching, U. WESTERN AUSTL. (Feb. 12, 2015), 
http://www.gtcentre.unsw.edu.au/sites/gtcentre.unsw.edu.au/files/poster_presentation_t_tulich.pd
f; Teaching with the Feminist Judgments Project, U. KENT, 
http://www.kent.ac.uk/law/fjp/resources/teaching.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2018).  
 8 THE CRITICAL JUDGMENTS PROJECT: RE-READING MONIS V THE QUEEN (Gabrielle 
Appleby & Rosalind Dixon eds., 2016) [hereinafter THE CRITICAL JUDGMENTS PROJECT]. 
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which to approach judicial decisionmaking.9  We have taken the view that there is a 
need to pluralize not just the feminist critique, but also the critical perspectives 
within such projects. 
We also believe that the structure of the feminist judgments project books may 
not be ideal to encouraging students, rather than scholars, to grasp the full diversity 
of critical perspectives within the law.  Most law teachers using the feminist 
judgments project will select only one or two cases for students to discuss.  This 
selection may itself also privilege certain feminist perspectives, leaving others 
largely unexplored in certain students’ educational experience. 
In brief, our project has compiled a series of rereadings from leading critical 
scholars across Australia of a famous Australian High Court decision, Monis v The 
Queen.  The project’s focus on a single case was intended to encourage students to 
engage more directly and immediately with the theory presented.  By focusing on a 
single case, this new project extends the teaching possibilities of the project, 
allowing teachers to expose students to a larger variety of critical legal perspectives 
without also needing to grasp changing factual and legal scenarios.  Further, students 
will more easily identify those aspects of commonality and difference across the 
perspectives, allowing them to develop a nuanced understanding of the critiques. 
The critical perspectives we have included in our project include feminism and 
the public-private divide, antisubordination feminism, critical race theory, 
intersectional theory, queer theory/poststructural feminism, the capabilities 
approach, international human rights theory, law and literature, political liberalism, 
law and economics, restorative justice, preventative justice, and deliberative 
democratic theory. 
The case of Monis involved a constitutional challenge to a criminal prohibition 
on the use of the postal services in a manner that a reasonable person would find 
offensive.  The challenge was based on Australia’s constitutional implied freedom 
of political communication.10  The challenge had been brought by Mr. Man Haron 
Monis and Ms. Amirah Droudis, who had been charged under the provision after 
sending a number of highly offensive letters to the families of soldiers killed in the 
war in Afghanistan.11 
In Monis, all of the justices agreed that the provision amounted to an effective 
burden on the implied freedom of communication, which left the point of contention 
 
 9 We are not alone in this observation.  It is recognized in the feminist judgments project 
itself and is now recognized by the expansion of the project into wild law and child rights. 
 10 Monis was charged under section 471.12 of the Criminal Code with thirteen counts of 
using the post in a way that reasonable persons would, in all the circumstances, regard as offensive.  
Monis v The Queen [2013] HCA 4, ¶ 4 (Austl.).  Ms. Amirah Droudis was charged with aiding and 
abetting Monis with eight of these counts.  Id.  Section 471.12 provides: 
A person commits an offence if: 
(a) the person uses a postal or similar service; and 
(b) the person does so in a way (whether by the method of use or the content of a 
communication, or both) that reasonable persons would regard as being, in all the 
circumstances, menacing, harassing or offensive. 
Penalty: Imprisonment for 2 years. 
Criminal Code Act 1995 s 471.12 (Austl.). 
 11 Monis v The Queen [2013] HCA 4, ¶ 1 (Austl.).   
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whether the provision was a proportionate legislative response to a legitimate state 
objective, consistent with Australia’s constitutional democratic system.  This 
question required the judges to grapple with deep issues about the appropriate role 
of the state in employing the criminal law to regulate civility of discourse and to 
protect vulnerable groups, and the ongoing influence of gender and race in 
approaching these issues. 
Monis also presented an ideal vehicle for The Critical Judgments Project for 
another reason.  The judges in Monis split evenly three to three on the question of 
whether the provision was in breach of the implied freedom.  The three male 
judges—Chief Justice Robert French, Justice, Kenneth Hayne, and Justice Dyson 
Heydon—found that the purpose of the provision was simply to prevent the postal 
service from being used in a menacing, harassing, or offensive manner.12  In 
determining whether such an objective was compatible with the maintenance of the 
system of government prescribed by the Constitution, both Chief Justice French and 
Justice Hayne held that the Australian system of government rested on a 
commitment to “robust” debate,13 often offensive and insulting.14 
The joint judgment of Justices Susan Crennan, Susan Kiefel, and Virginia Bell 
construed the purpose of the statute very differently.  They held that a key aim of the 
provision was to “recognise a citizen’s desire to be free, if not the expectation that 
they will be free, from the intrusion into their personal domain of unsolicited 
material which is seriously offensive.”15  They found that this objective was 
consistent with the constitutionally prescribed system of representative and 
responsible government. 
Divided three to three, Monis was ultimately decided by a procedural rule.  For 
the purposes of this project, it therefore suggests a natural opening for critical 
constitutional analysis: if members of the High Court of Australia were themselves 
unable to agree on a majority position in the case, this suggests a particular value in 
turning to other ways of thinking about constitutional law, or constitutional values, 
in trying to understand and address the problem the Court confronted. 
The case was also an ideal vehicle because it was the first in which the High 
Court split along gender lines.  Helen Irving notes not only the gender split in the 
judgment as significant, but also comments on the different approaches taken by the 
female judges.16  Gabrielle Appleby and Ngaire Naffine have observed that the male 
judges in the case, and particularly Justice Hayne, present offensive speech as a 
legitimate, if not essential, part of political discourse in Australia: “[A] constitutional 
imperative to be defended.”17  They observe, for instance, that “[Justice] Hayne [] 
 
 12 Id. ¶ 73 (French, C.J.); id. ¶ 97 (Hayne, J.). 
 13 Id. ¶ 67 (French, C.J.). 
 14 See generally Adrienne Stone, ‘Insult and Emotion, Calumny and Invective’: Twenty 
Years of Freedom of Political Communication, 30 U. QUEENSL. L.J. 79 (2011). 
 15 Monis v The Queen [2013] HCA 4 ¶ 320 (Austl.) (Crennan, J., Kiefel, J. & Bell, J.); see 
also id. ¶ 348. 
 16 See Helen Irving, Constitutional Interpretation: A Woman’s Voice?, U. SYDNEY (Mar. 20, 
2013), http://blogs.usyd.edu.au/womansconstitution/2013/03/constitutional_interpretation_1.html. 
 17 Gabrielle Appleby & Ngaire Naffine, Civility, Gender and the Law: Critical Reflections 
on the Judgments in Monis v The Queen, 24 GRIFFITH L. REV. 616, 625 (2015). 
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conflates the experiences of all members of society, the experiences of men and 
women in public discourse, and majority responses and minority responses.”18 
A case in which the identity of the various justices was clearly so salient is also 
a particularly natural one for introducing students to the idea that who judges are, 
and how they understand notions of constitutional justice, may matter to the 
resolution of concrete constitutional questions. 
Finally, the case of Monis became one of enduring public interest in Australia 
because of the subsequent hostage terrorist actions of Mr. Monis in the Lindt Café 
in Sydney’s Martin Place in December 2014, in which two of those hostages and 
Monis were killed.19  One of those killed was a Sydney lawyer and University of 
New South Wales graduate, Katrina Dawson.20  This occurred just days after 
Monis’s request for special leave to the High Court to rehear the matter was refused. 
As a focused and directed teaching tool, The Critical Judgments Project is 
different in structure from the feminist judgments project in another way.  Rather 
than providing a commentary to each judgment, which explains the case, its political, 
historical, social and economic context, and engaging in an explanation and critique 
of the approach adopted in the judgment, each judgment author in The Critical 
Judgments Project was asked to select a small number of extracts from canonical 
texts on which the relevant approach is based, supplemented, if necessary, by a short 
commentary explaining the approach.  This gave students, often coming to the 
theories for the first time, the necessary grounding in the seminal thinkers and 
concepts on which the judgment is based. 
In the judgments themselves, some of the authors focused directly on the facts 
and legal issues as they were presented in case.  Others used the broad factual 
background or legal framework to explore broader issues relating to hate speech, 
intimidation, racial and gender justice, and the public sphere, or constitutional issues 
concerning the relationship between the implied freedom of political communication 
and prohibitions on offensive speech more generally.  Like many of the judgments 
in the feminist judgments project, some judgments focus directly on relevant legal 
issues.  Others focus on questions of style and method in legal reasoning, and the 
need to engage with more expansive legal and nonlegal contexts in which 
offensiveness is regulated and has an impact, or the consequences of the law through, 
perhaps, social research or different assumptions of knowledge.  The chapters 
pluralize readers’ understanding of substantive values that are protected and 
promoted by the law, or those that should in fact underpin it. 
The nature of the exercise of rewriting the Monis judgment undertaken by 
authors in this book has necessarily constrained them.  Some liberties with judicial 
method have been taken that might stretch the boundaries of the judicial role, but the 
chapters each produce alternative imaginings of the judgments, an alternative 
imagining of the law.  For many of the contributors writing from a highly critical 
perspective, this has meant working within the confines of quite artificial, and indeed 
 
 18 Id. 
 19 The Many Faces of Lindt Siege Gunman Monis, ABC NEWS (May 22, 2017), 
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-05-22/lindt-cafe-sydney-siege-gunman-man-haron-
monis/8375858. 
 20 Id. 
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sometimes quite personally difficult, constraints.  The judgment of Anne Macduff 
and Wayne Morgan, for example, is prefaced by explaining the inherent 
contradiction in the concept of a queer or poststructural feminist judgment on the 
basis that queer theory and poststructuralism are deployed as tools of deconstruction 
and critique of law and the legal system and thus are in necessary and inherent 
opposition to them.21  A queer/poststructural judgment “would either not be ‘queer,’ 
or it would not be a ‘judgment.’”22  Their judgment is framed as one informed by the 
critique of the theories, and in this more limited way brings the critical perspective 
within the legal paradigm.  For the project as a whole, it has also meant that it is 
impossible to include within the main section of the book certain critiques of the 
law, which question law itself as a helpful structure or discourse for achieving social 
and political change.  We have sought to address this, however, by ending the 
collection with a chapter from Margaret Davies providing a form of truly external 
critical reflection on the contributions found earlier in the final chapter.23 
As a focused teaching tool, students are given a series of questions at the 
commencement of the book to assist them in navigating the critical perspectives and 
reading the judgments, and to also understand the purpose of the rereading project, 
which captures the objectives to which all of the critical judgments projects are 
directed.  These questions are: 
Did the judgment noticeably depart from traditional formal legal methods of 
reasoning, and if so, how?  Did, for example, the judgment employ empirical 
research, or other information/knowledge?  Do you think any identified departure is 
an important addition to legal decisionmaking? 
How is the “story” of the case told in the judgment?  Do you think this has an 
influence on the reasoning and outcome? 
What are the different groups within the community who are represented in the 
judgments: Who is included, who is excluded?  Why these groups and not others? 
What does this mean for the development of the reasoning, if any?  What might it 
mean for the selection and appointment of judges who can deliver such judgments 
in like cases in the future? 
Does the reasoning reveal that apparently neutral, objective norms have 
discriminatory implications for historically excluded groups, including women, 
Indigenous Australians, and racial or religious minority groups? 
Do you think the judgment results in a more “just” decision than those reached 
by the High Court judges in Monis, either in terms of its reasoning or outcome? 
What are the flaws that you can identify in the judgment as rewritten, either 
from a traditional legal approach, the critical perspective adopted, or from another 
perspective?  How might these be remedied? 
Is the judgment transparent about the reasoning employed to reach its 
outcome? 
 
 21 Anne Macduff & Wayne Morgan, Queer Theory and Poststructuralist Feminism, in THE 
CRITICAL JUDGMENTS PROJECT, supra note 8, at 73. 
 22 Id. 
 23 See Margaret Davies, Critical Judging, in THE CRITICAL JUDGMENTS PROJECT, supra 
note 8, at 218. 
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How, if at all, did the rewritten judgment show the contingency of existing 
legal approaches and theoretical approaches to questions of constitutional law of this 
kind? 
What critical perspective/s are not included in the book?  How would you 
rewrite the judgment from other perspectives?24
 
 24 See Gabrielle Appleby & Rosalind Dixon, Critical Thinking in Constitutional Law and 
Monis v The Queen, in THE CRITICAL JUDGMENTS PROJECT, supra note 8, at 1. 
